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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
SCHENDEL V. CURTIS: DNA STANDARDS
MISAPPLIED TO FUSION PROTEIN PATENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
The majority in Schendel v. Curtis1 held that reduction to
practice of a fusion protein required the molecular weight of the
protein, the amino acid sequence of the protein and/or the DNA
sequence of the coding region of the vector used to produce the
protein. This holding discourages patenting of important scientific
inventions that may help in the treatment of serious human
illnesses.
Cancer kills hundreds of thousands of people each year and still
continues to baffle scientists today. Treatments have included
surgical removal of the tumor, chemotherapy, and in the most
serious cases, bone marrow transplant. The treatments themselves
indicate the seriousness of the disease-the killing or removal of all
of the cells that could have been affected by the disease with a hope
that more cancerous cells than healthy cells will be killed. In the
case of the bone marrow transplant, the treatment itself can cause
the death of the patient.
In an effort to reduce the fatal risks involved in the treatment,
scientists have begun administering colony stimulating factors to
help the body regenerate its own healthy cells after the diseased
cells have been removed. Specifically, the use of granulo-
cyte/macrophage colony stimulating factor (GM-CSF or G-CSF) and
interleukin-3 has been associated with faster recovery' as well as
1 83 F.3d 1399, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1743 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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lower morbidity and mortality in certain cancer patients.3 At-
tempting to create a more potent treatment for cancer patients,
Schendel and Curtis independently decided to create a single
protein consisting of both IL-3 and G-CSF.4
Although the efforts of both groups of researchers were admira-
ble, a patent on the fusion protein could be granted to only one
group. Thus, the race was on. The first researcher or group of
researchers to produce the fusion protein would enjoy an exclusive
20 year monopoly and the possibility of enormous financial
rewards. Though it seemed that Curtis had won the race by
applying for the patent first, Schendel nevertheless asserted that
he was the first to invent. Under the United States' current "first
to invent" system, as opposed to the "first to file" system of most
other countries, Schendel could obtain the patent if he proved that
he was first to reduce to practice, or synthesize, the fusion protein.
Unfortunately for the parties involved, this seemingly bright line
rule becomes particularly hazy in the biotechnology arena as the
researcher in this field cannot prove possession as easily as can
inventors in other fields. The scientist cannot hold DNA or protein
in his hand and "show" the Patent Board the product he possessed
on the date in question. Instead, time of possession is determined
by subjecting the product to various tests, many of which must be
combined to arrive at a conclusion and which may be subject to
different interpretations.
Due to the problems outlined above, plus the fact that this was
the first reduction to practice case dealing with a fusion protein,
the majority of the court in Schendel v. Curtis set forth a somewhat
unclear opinion. The court could have avoided this confusion had
it correctly overturned the Patent Board's decision based on its
failure to apply the prima facie standard of summary judgment
proceedings. Instead of overturning the Board, the majority held
that proof of reduction to practice required the molecular weight of
the protein along with the amino acid sequence of the protein
and/or the DNA sequence of the vector.5 This Recent Develop-
' L. Sachs, The Control of Hematopoiesis and Leukemia: from Basic Biology to the Clinic,
93 PROc. NATL ACAD. Sci. 4742-49 (1996).
4 Id. at 1399.
5 Schendel, 83 F.3d at 1403.
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ment, which concurs with the dissent in Schendel, questions the
majority's reasoning that led to such a stringent requirement for
reduction to practice and concludes that the standard is misapplied
in light of the history of reduction to practice in the Federal Circuit,
the nature of the patented product and the standards of the
profession.
II. SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND
As discussed above, Schendel involved two groups of researchers
who both claimed to have produced an IL-3/G-CSF fusion protein.
IL-3 (Interleukin-3) and G-CSF (Granulocyte-Colony Stimulating
Factor) are both proteins known as colony stimulating factors, or
cytokines, which stimulate different types of leukocyte colonies to
develop from bone marrow cells." After fetal life, the bone marrow
of the hollow bones is the body's source of new blood cells.7 The
term "blood cells" refers to red cells that 'carry oxygen to the
tissues, platelets that aid in clotting, and white blood cells that act
as the body's defense against disease.8 The white blood cells
consist mainly of macrophages, lymphocytes and granulocytes.9
IL-3 and G-CSF stimulate bone marrow cells to differentiate into
these white blood cells (also called hematopoiesis) 1° and thus
greatly affect the body's ability to mount an immune response.
This essential role of IL-3 and G-CSF in hematopoiesis and
subsequent development of the immune system has led many
researchers to study these cytokines. Prior to Schendel's or Curtis's
creation of a fusion protein, several earlier studies had shown that
IL-3 and G-CSF may cross-compete for the same receptor on
6 ABUL K. ABBAS ET AL., CELLULAR AND MOLECULAR IMMUNOLOGY 22-23 (Martin J.
Wonsiewicz ed., 1991).
7 Id.
'JOHN W. HOLE, JR., HUMAN ANATOMY AND PHYSIoLOGY 612 (1984).
Id. at 618-20.
1o ABBAS ET AL., supra note 6, at 22-23. Hematopoiesis is simply a process by which an
immature immune cell that has the potential to become any and all types of mature immune
cells follows a path of development to become one particular kind of immune cell.
Differentiation occurs when cytokines such as IL-3 and G-CSF bind to receptors on the
outside of the immature cell and send a signal to the inside of the cell.
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myoblasts during the early stages of differentiation. 1 The work
of these scientists and others caused Curtis and Schendel to believe
that a fusion protein consisting of IL-3 and G-CSF might be able to
augment hematopoiesis. 2 Thus began the legal battle over the
patent rights to the IL-3/G-CSF fusion protein.
Before one can have a complete understanding of the decision of
the Federal Circuit in Schendel, the reader must have some
familiarity with DNA, proteins, and the methods used to create the
fusion protein in order to understand the reasoning behind the
opinions of the majority and dissent.
DNA contains the genetic information that determines each
person's characteristics. 3 The part of the DNA molecule that
encodes a particular trait (such as eye color) is called a gene.' 4
One gene directs the production of one protein as the gene acts as
the blueprint for the protein. 5 To explain further, DNA is
composed of two chains of four heterocyclic nitrogenous bases
(adenine, guanine, cytosine and thymine) joined together by
phosphodiester linkages. 16 The two chains are held together due
to the complimentarity, or binding, of adenine with thymine and
guanine with cytosine. 7
The chain of bases is "read" by an RNA polymerase, which
transfers the information to another chain called messenger RNA
(mRNA)."s This process is called transcription. In a somewhat
similar manner, the mRNA is read three bases at a time and
translated into a chain of amino acids known as a protein.' 9 Thus
" S.A. Cannistra, Differentiation-Associated Expression of Two Functionally Distinct
Classes of Granulocyte-Macrophage Colony-Stimulating Factor Receptors on Human Myeloid
Cells, 265 J. BIOL. CHEM. 12656-63 (1990). Cross competition occurs when two cytokines
bind to the same receptor and thus compete with one another.
" B.M. Curtis, Enhanced Hematopoietic Activity of a Human Granulocyte /Macrophage
Colony-Stimulating Factor-Interleukin 3 Fusion Protein, 88 PROC. NATL. AcAD. SU. 5809-13
(1991).
"HOLE, supra note 8, at 89.
'4 Id.
16 MAXINE SINGER & PAUL BERG, GENES AND GENOMES 21 (Carol Dempster et al. eds.,
1991).16 Id. at 37.
17 Id. at 42.
'a See generally SINGER & BERG, supra note 15, at 131-45 (describing transcription).
19 Id. at 157. There are only twenty amino acids and many more combinations of three
bases; thus the genetic code is considered to be redundant. The importance of this fact is
that there can be mutations that cause a base to change but do not change the amino acid
in the protein. Id.
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the sequence of the DNA chain determines the sequence of the
mRNA, which ultimately determines the sequence of the amino acid
chain. In turn, the sequence of amino acids in this chain deter-
mines the shape and function of the protein.2"
Although these processes of transcription and translation occur
in our bodies constantly, the amount of DNA and/or protein needed
for most scientific experiments is too great to be obtained from
human tissue. In addition, experiments such as those of Schendel
and Curtis entail making a protein that is not found in the body.
Since scientists cannot use the human system, they have turned to
other smaller systems such as bacterial cells or yeast. Through the
use of these other systems scientists can first isolate a human gene
from a human cell, then produce that gene or the protein it encodes
in large enough quantities to be used in experiments and ultimate-
ly manipulate the genes using recombinant DNA techniques.21
Since the genes for IL-3 and G-CSF were already isolated and
produced in large quantities, both Schendel and Curtis needed only
to use the recombinant DNA techniques to join the two genes so
that a single fusion protein could be produced. These techniques
are commonly referred to as "cut and paste" techniques since a
common DNA vector, or circular piece of DNA, is "cut" and the
DNA coding for the desired protein is "pasted" into the vector.2 2
In the case of the IL-3/G-CSF fusion protein, this "cutting and
pasting" created a circle of DNA composed of vector DNA, the DNA
encoding IL-3 and the DNA encoding G-CSF. The latter two pieces
of DNA were adjacent to each other in the vector with only a small
piece of DNA, called a linker, in between.2 3
After both Schendel and Curtis used these techniques to insert
the DNA into the vector, each scientist inserted the vector into a
host eukaryotic cell that is able to accept the DNA as its own, then
transcribe and translate the DNA into a protein. Because the
protein structure is based upon the DNA structure, the adjacent
pieces of IL-3 and G-CSF DNA were transcribed and translated
into a single protein composed of both IL-3 and G-CSF.
20 Id. at 64-65.
21 See generally, SINGER & BERG, supra note 15, at 262-76 (explaining recombinant DNA
techniques).
' For a general overview of vectors, their selection and identification, see SINGER & BERG,
supra note 15, at 265-76.
' Schendel v. Curtis, 83 F.3d 1399, 1407 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
1997] 357
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III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Paul Schendel was the junior party to the interference suit
regarding the creation of a fusion protein of IL-3 and G-CSF and
was the applicant for U.S. Patent Application 08/057,198, which
was accorded the benefit of an August 29, 1990 filing date.24
Benson Curtis, one of the applicants for U.S. Patent 5,073,627,
claimed invention of the same fusion protein that was accorded the
filing date of August 22, 1989.2
Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. section 1.608, the patent examiner
required Schendel to submit evidence that he was "prima facie
entitled to a judgment" along with an explanation stating with
particularity why he was prima facie entitled to the judgment."
Responding to this requirement, Schendel asserted that he was
entitled to judgment due to his reduction to practice of the fusion
protein before Curtis filed for his patent.27 Although the interfer-
ence was declared, the Administrative Patent Judge (APJ) immedi-
ately required Schendel to show why judgment should not be
rendered against him.2s The APJ asserted in this order that
Schendel did not have sufficient corroboration and that he did not
provide evidence that he had "reduced to practice a fusion protein
meeting every limitation of the count."29 The majority of the
Patent Board agreed with the APJ's conclusion and entered a
decision granting summary judgment to Curtis.30 One Board
member dissented because he believed that the majority had
Id. at 1400.
' Id.
2 Id. at 1401. 37 C.F.R. § 1.608 provides that when the earlier of the filing date or the
effective filing date of an application is more than three months after the earlier of the filing
date or the effective filing date under 35 U.S.C. § 120 of a patent, before an interference will
be declared, the applicant shall file: (1) evidence, which may consist of patents or printed
publications, other documents, and one or more affidavits that demonstrate the applicant is
prima facie entitled to a judgment relative to the patentee; and (2) an explanation stating
with particularity the basis upon which the applicant isprima facie entitled to the judgment.
" Schendel v. Curtis, 83 F.3d 1399, 1401 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
28Id.
29 Id. at 1402.
30 Id. In a footnote, the dissent labeled the make-up of the board as "curious" since after
the APJ made the first summary judgment decision, it was reviewed by the three member
board presided over by the APJ "who wrote an opinion sustaining his action, quoting himself
with approval.* Id. at 1406 n.1.
358 [Vol. 4:353
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subjected Schendel to an excessively high burden of proof.3'
An appeal by Schendel followed on the grounds that he had
provided prima facie evidence, that he was entitled to a judgment
of priority, and that the board did not apply the "rule of reason"
standard in its analysis.32 The majority of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit declined to adopt Schen-
del's position and concluded that Schendel did not provide any
"probative data relevant to the composition or structure" of the
fusion protein and thus did not show that he prepared such a
protein meeting all the limitations of the count.'
IV. MAJORITY ANALYSIS
A. REDUCTION TO PRACTICE
The court in Schendel first noted that it would make a de novo
review of the board's legal conclusions, such as its decision on
reduction to practice," whereas it would review the board's factual
findings for clear error.' Citing its decision in Hahn v. Wong,'
the court also established that priority would only be granted to the
junior party if the patented product met every limitation of the
interference count.37 The court specifically concentrated on Count
I of the interference, which required in part "a 'fusion protein' in
which the specified components 'are linked either directly or
through a peptide linker.' "'
Following these guidelines, the majority considered the items of
evidence Schendel provided to support his claim of reduction to
practice, specifically the plasmid or vector construction, transfec-
1 Jd. at 1402.
n Schendel, 83 F.3d at 1404 n.7. The "rule of reason" standard requires that the PTO
examine and analyze all the pertinent evidence. Holmwood v. Sugavanam, 948 F.2d 1236,
1239, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1712, 1714 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
33 Schendel, 83 F.3d at 1404.
SId. at 1402 (following Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc. 802 F.2d 1367,
1376, 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 81, 87 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 947 (1987)).35 id.
'* 892 F.2d 1028, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1313 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
37 Schendel v. Curtis, 83 F.3d 1399, 1402 ( Fed. Cir. 1996) (citing Hahn v. Wong, 892 F.2d
at 1032, 13 U.S.P.Q. at 1317).N Id.
1997] 359
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tion, production of protein and the identification of the protein.39
Schendel had declared that he had constructed a plasmid contain-
ing the IL-3 and G-CSF genes with a linker in between. Although
he had verified the junctions between the two genes via sequenc-
ing,' the court concluded that this was not sufficient proof.
41
The majority instead required sequencing of the coding region of
the genes, possibly as proof that Schendel actually began with an
IL-3/G-CSF containing vector.42
Moving to the fusion protein itself, the majority concluded that
there was insufficient proof of its existence in Schendel's hands.'
The majority first attacked the evidence of the transfection
provided in Schendel's notebook that "all cultures induced wel."
44
Relying on Curtis's assertion that the graphs provided by Schendel
did not indicate protein levels but only host cell growth, the
majority discounted the data's significance.46
In relation to the structure of the protein, the majority also was
not convinced Schendel's evidence had any probative value. It
based its reasoning on Schendel's failure to sequence the protein46
and determine the molecular weight of the protein when he clearly
could have done so.
4 1
Finally, the court considered Schendel's claim that the fusion
protein had biological activity that would be attributable to both an
IL-3 portion and a G-CSF portion. The evidence provided to the
court consisted of declarations of other researchers who performed
the individual assays. 4" Although the court agreed that the
evidence established that some tested samples "exhibited biological
activity characteristic of IL-3 and G-CSF proteins," the court
3 Id. at 1403-04.
' Sequencing is a chemical process that determines the order of the bases in a DNA
molecule. DONALD VOET & JUDITH VOET, BIOCHEMISTRY 830-35 (Jeanette Stiefel ed., 1990).





" The court was referring to the amino acid sequence of the protein. For further
information on sequencing of protein see generally, VOET & VOET, supra note 40, at 110-13.
4" The court noted that Schendel had performed an analysis of the molecular weight of
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believed it did not show that Schendel had produced an IL-3/G-CSF
fusion protein.49 Corroborating statements of the researchers
performing the assays did not correct the deficiency since the
statements were dismissed as inconclusive due to the second hand
nature of their knowledge of the protein's identity.' Reiterating
the PTO Board's opinion, the majority concluded that these results
could still be obtained by a mixture of the two proteins.5 '
Thus, the majority of the court concluded that there was a critical
deficiency in any evidence showing that Schendel had actually
produced a fusion protein.52 According to the majority there was
no probative evidence that the plasmid vector contained IL-3 and
G-CSF and no evidence of the protein's molecular weight, amino
acid sequence or biological activity.' This decision was essential-
ly an acceptance of the Patent Board's conclusions as the majority
felt that there was no clear error in the Board's factual analysis.
Consequently, the court also agreed that the Board's legal analysis
concerning reduction to practice was correct.'
B. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Near the end of its opinion, the majority cursorily dismissed the
dissent's view that for summary judgment and priority purposes all
of Schendel's allegations must be considered to be true.' The
court stated that this standard should not be applied since
Schendel did not argue for such a standard and also commented
that the whole nub of the case was the lack of probative evi-
dence."
49d.
' Id. (citing as'the controlling case on this aspect of corroboration Frilette v. Kimberlin,
412 F.2d 1390, 1398, 162 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 148 (C.C.P.A. 1969)).
51 Schendel, 83 F.3d at 1404.
'Id.
I&
The court did not consider the "rule of reason" standard since the decision concerning
reduction to practice alone required affirmation of the board's decision. Id. at 1404 n.7.
Id. at 1404 n.8.
Schendel v. Curtis, 83 F.3d 1399, 1404 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
1997] 361
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V. DISSENT ANALYSIS
A. REDUCTION TO PRACTICE
The dissent's disagreement with the majority hinged primarily on
two basic concepts that Judge Newman believed were present and
applicable in this case. These were that the use of known reagents
should reduce the amount of proof required for a product of
recombinant DNA technology and that the standard of the profes-
sion should be followed in such cases.
Judge Newman began with a consideration of the evidence
concerning the vector and argued that Schendel began with a
plasmid containing known DNA sequences for IL-3 and G-CSF.5"
These known sequences were placed in a vector with a known
sequence at known restriction sites.' Although Judge Newman
tentatively stated that she believed the methods used by Schendel
could not change the protein in any way,59 she emphasized that
such methods are accepted by the scientific community.' She also
noted that Curtis himself had no objection to such methods."1 All
of these considerations led the dissent to claim that requiring
Schendel to sequence the entire coding regions (instead of simply
sequencing the linker regions) would only require him to "re-prove
the basic structures." 2
The scientific proof concerning the molecular weight of the
protein also provided a source of disagreement for the dissent.
Judge Newman openly rebutted the statements of the majority and
the Board that Schendel did not determine the molecular weight of
the protein.' She claimed that Schendel had provided calcula-
tions of the specific activity of the fusion protein relative to its
'i Id. at 1407.
'id.
Id. at 1408. This statement is not totally correct as mutations do arise during
replication and transcription. Yet due to the redundancy of the genetic code, most of these
mutations do not result in an amino acid change in the protein.
60 Schendel v. Curtis, 83 F.3d 1399, 1407 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
1 Id. at 1406.
2 Id. at 1407. The dissent also asserted that the biological assays were accepted methods
to determine IL-3 (MO7e Assay) and G-CSF activity (Murine Bone Marrow Assay). I& at
1408.
a3 Id. at 1408-1409.
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molecular weight." This was a more specific assay than simply
determining the molecular weight since it showed how much of the
protein had a particular activity and also how pure the protein
sample was. According to Judge Newman, the results Schendel
produced showed that half of the fusion protein had IL-3 activity,
half had G-CSF activity and that the resultant fusion protein had
the expected molecular weight."
Although the dissent did not explicitly state that the Patent
Board committed clear error in its review of the facts, one can infer
such a conclusion from Judge Newman's serious disagreements
with the Board's interpretation of Schendel's scientific results. The
dissent seemed to assert that the court must draw its own inferenc-
es from the evidence, but that these inferences must be in accor-
dance with the scientific community.
B. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The dissent declared that the factual evidence provided by
Schendel should be taken at face value and not questioned."
Judge Newman based this belief on the fact that 37 C.F.R. section
1.617 expressly provides for summary judgment proceedings in an
interference and noted that truth of factual evidence is not to be
determined in a summary judgment proceeding. 7 Not accepting
the majority's contention that there simply was no evidence,
Newman pointed to the sequencing of the linker regions and
specific activity data, which all illustrated the existence of the
fusion protein in Schendel's hands.'
Schendel, 83 F.3d at 1409.
Id. The specific activity can be determined by comparing the IL-3 activity of the fusion
protein divided by its molecular weight with the IL-3 activity of an IL-3 dimer divided by its
molecular weight. Schendel's actual results were that the IL-3/G-CSF fusion protein had
46% IL-3 activity compared to an IL-3 dimer. Id.
N Schendel v. Curtis, 83 F.3d 1399, 1406 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citing Kahl v. Scoville, 609
F.2d 991, 995, 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 652, 656 (C.C.P.A. 1979)).
6Id. at 1409. Judge Newman also cited Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
255 (1986), and Kahl v. Scoville, 609 F.2d at 995, as requiring that evidence must be
insufficient on its face.
" Schendel, 83 F.3d at 1408-09.
1997] 363
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VI. ANALYSIS
The question of how much evidence should be required to prove
a prima facie case of reduction to practice in the biotech area is
difficult to answer. The Patent Board in Schendel seemed to make
this decision even more difficult by failing to recognize the meaning
of prima facie proof. Contrary to the text of controlling statutes,
precedent, and the unique nature of a patent case, the Board threw
out important data and asked for explanations concerning other
evidence presented. Declining to recognize the Patent Board's
mistakes, the majority in Schendel accepted the Board's criticisms
of Schendel's data and in turn created a standard for proof of
reduction to practice of a fusion protein that is too stringent. The
majority overlooked the differences between DNA and protein as it
seemingly followed prior cases dealing with DNA patents and never
investigated the standard methods used by the scientific communi-
ty. Instead, the majority attempted to apply bright line rules to
ungroupable situations and erroneously upheld the Patent Board's
decision.
A. SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND THE PRIMA FACIE STANDARD
The dissent correctly argued that Schendel only had to provide
prima facie proof of reduction to practice, and, therefore, his
evidence should have been taken at face value. 37 C.F.R. section
1.617, prior case law, and the common meaning of "prima facie" all
support this "at face value" interpretation. Nevertheless, the
majority curtly stated that Schendel could not receive the benefit
of such an interpretation because he did not argue for this stan-
dard. Contrary to statutory and judicial precedent, the majority
threw out Schendel's data when he did not answer criticisms by
Curtis nor dispel hypothetical problems posited by the Board.
Although the majority set forth the applicable statute and prior
case law in its analysis, it failed to apply them to the case at bar.
For example, the majority cited 37 C.F.R. section 1.617(a), which
states in part that the "APJ shall review any evidence filed by an
applicant under § 1.608(b) to determine if the applicant is prima
364 [Vol. 4:353
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facie entitled to a judgment relative to the patentee.' s  The
statute also states that the APJ should require proof of why
summary judgment should not be entered only after the applicant
has failed to show that he is prima facie entitled to judgment.70
Additionally, the majority stated that in an interference case, the
junior party is required "to prove so much of his case as to entitle
him to an award of priority if the [senior party] were to rely only
on his filing date and were not to rebut any of the Uunior party's]
case."
71
Yet after stating this rule, the majority failed to follow its own
directive as Curtis was allowed to rebut Schendel's case concerning
the transfection data. The court relied on, and permitted the Board
to rely on, Curtis's criticism that Schendel's transfection results had
no probative value.72 This reliance is not in accord with section
1.617 as the Federal Circuit previously held that an issue of fact is
created when one party offers a different interpretation of the data.
In Chiron Corp. v. Abbott Laboratories73 the junior party, Abbott,
produced an immunoblot 74 as evidence of anti-HIV antibodies in
serum recognizing the env protein.75 Chiron declared that all of
Abbott's evidence was inconclusive and specifically that the
immunoblot was uninterpretable and did not show a successful
immunoassay.76 The court did not grant summary judgment but
instead stated that there was a question of fact regarding reduction
to practice. 77 Similarly, the court in Schendel should have real-
ized that Schendel did surpass the summary judgment standard
' Schendel v. Curtis, 83 F.3d 1399, 1401 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
70 Id.
' Id. at 1402.
7' If Schendel did not adequately explain the meaning of his graph then this data should
not pass the prima facie case. However, Curtis's assertion that the data was inconclusive
should have no bearing on whether the data passed the prima facie case.
"' 902 F. Supp. 1103 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
71 Immunoblotting or Western blotting is a process by which a protein is run through a
gel, transferred to a membrane and probed (bound) with an antibody that specifically reacts
with that protein. See ABBAS ET AL., supra note 6, 63-65. The purpose of the experiment
here was to show that the researcher had successfully generated antibodies that would
recognize an HIV surface protein.
7' 902 F. Supp. at 1123-24. The env protein is an envelope protein of HIV. The envelope
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applied in patent cases and that Curtis's criticism created an issue
of fact.
In addition to allowing Curtis to rebut Schendel's case, the
majority also accepted criticisms of the Board. The main criticism
of the Board and the majority was that Schendel might have
possessed a mixture of the two proteins instead of a fusion
protein.7" The court believed that Schendel did not dispel such a
possibility due to the lack of molecular weight data, amino acid
sequence, and DNA coding region sequence. Yet the court failed to
recognize that requiring Schendel to answer these accusations was
contradictory to the Federal Circuit's prior interpretation of section
1.617.
Although the court denied that Schendel's data should be taken
at face value, it took its own rule from cases that stand for just
such a proposition. The court derived its "no rebuttal" rule from
previous Federal Circuit cases such as Hahn v. Wong, 79 which
required that the evidence be insufficient on its face for summary
judgment to be granted under 37 C.F.R. section 1.617."° The
majority should not only follow this interpretation because it is
precedent, but also because it is more appropriate than the
standard promulgated here by the majority when one considers the
nature of scientific proof inherent in patent cases.
Scientific proof is essentially indirect evidence of a fact, and
therefore more than one piece of evidence is often needed to prove
that fact. For example, Schendel cannot prove that he had
possession of a fusion protein the way a car manufacturer can show
he possessed a model or drawings of a new car design. The minute
size of the patented product often requires that indirect evidence in
the form of various physical manipulations suffice as proof of the
product's existence. Indirect evidence includes manipulations such
as protein sequencing, DNA sequencing, molecular weight determi-
nations and functional assays. Although each experiment or
7 8 Schendel, 83 F.3d at 1403-04.
7 892 F.2d 1028, 1032 (Fed. Cir. 1989). See also Kistler v. Weber 412 F.2d 280, 285, 162
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 214, 218 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (noting that the junior party must prove so much
of his case as would entitle him to an award of priority if the senior party relied only on his
filing date); Kahl v. Scoville, 609 F.2d at 995 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (stating that the court must
assume the junior party's allegations are true).
8 Schendel, 83 F.3d at 1402.
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manipulation has a result, the result may be incorrect, and thus a
complete explanation of the procedure, including control data, must
be presented to ensure the accuracy of the data.
The rule set forth in prior case law that requires that the junior
party's case must be taken at face value recognizes that questions
concerning the interpretation of the data will arise and that
requiring the junior party to disprove each possible problem is too
heavy of a burden at the summary judgment stage."1 Such a
stringent requirement could easily lead to a prerequisite that the
litigant prove his entire case before his case in chief since there is
no logical stopping point. Regarding the case at bar, because
judicial and statutory requirements only require prima facie
evidence during a summary judgment proceeding, speculation
concerning the presence of two proteins instead of one single fusion
protein should only be disproved during Schendel's case in chief.
If the majority had applied the correct prima facie standard, the
court necessarily would have overruled the board since the evidence
Schendel provided did show at first sight that he produced the
fusion protein. Upon closer scrutiny, it seems that Schendel had
even more than prima facie proof of reduction to practice of the IL-
3/G-CSF fusion protein. Consider first the linker region sequences.
This data showed that the IL-3 and G-CSF genes were placed in
the vector adjacent to each other, that both genes were in the
correct orientation, and that there was a linker in between.
Therefore, based on the recombinant DNA techniques Schendel
used and the subsequent verification of the vector, it would be
physically impossible for the host cells to produce two separate
proteins. This is because such a scenario could only occur if either
the host cell produced one of the proteins endogenously or if each
gene was on a separate vector.
The separate vector theory is invalid due to sequencing of the
linker, and the host cells do not produce either IL-3 or G-CSF
endogenously since these are human genes and the host cell is
bacterial. The only other possible explanation for the presence of
$'In agreement with this interpretation, Black's Law Dictionary defines "prima facie" as
.at first sight" or "on the first appearance" while "prima facie case" is defined as one that
"will prevail until contradicted or overcome by other evidence." BLACIS LAW DICTIONARY,
825 (6th ed. 1991).
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two separate proteins is that the fusion protein was cleaved after
it was transcribed and translated. The majority claims that
Schendel did not account for this problem since he did not deter-
mine the molecular weight of the protein. 2 Although the dissent
disagreed, as she claimed that Schendel did determine the molecu-
lar weight since he provided the specific activity on a molar
basis,' this author cannot be sure which characterization is
correct based upon either opinion. It is possible that Schendel
performed the specific activity calculations based on an assumption
of the protein's molecular weight without actually determining it
experimentally,"' but the specific activity results combined with
the DNA evidence and the improbability of post-translational
cleavage show that Schendel likely possessed the fusion protein.'
Thus, after analyzing the scientific evidence provided by Schen-
del, it points to the conclusion that he did produce a fusion protein
consisting of IL-3 and G-CSF. Admittedly, this Recent Develop-
ment has "filled in the gaps" and provided arguments where
Schendel's attorney may not have, but these arguments are not
needed to get Schendel over the prima facie barrier that the
Federal Circuit has previously followed. As the dissent notes,
Schendel did provide the court with data--evidence he sequenced
the linker sites, specific activity data and results of functional
assays. This evidence sufficiently shows at face value that
Schendel reduced the fusion protein to practice.
82 Schendel, 83 F.3d at 1404.
'3 Id. at 1408-1409.
" In order to determine specific activity on a molar basis, Schendel must have
determined the molecular weight of the protein. However, it is not clear from the dissent's
description of Schendel's calculations whether the molecular weight was experimentally
determined or if Schendel simply assumed what the molecular weight should be. If the
latter were the case, Schendel's specific activity calculations would be the same regardless
of whether the assay was performed on a single fusion protein or a mixture of the two
separate IL-3 and G-CSF proteins.
' Although not related to the prima facie standard per se, the court also disregarded data
when it incorrectly applied Frilette v. Kimberlin 412 F.2d 1390 (C.C.PA 1969), which held
that there was no corroboration of a substance's identity from reading the label on a tube
holding the substance. Schendel, 83 F.3d at 1403. This case does not apply here since the
corroboration came from scientists who actually performed the assays to determine if it was
a fusion protein; they did not simply read the label in deciding if the substance was a fusion
protein. The majority also discounted the evidence because each test alone did not prove the
claim. Yet one biological study could not test for both activities due to the nature of each
assay, and thus it was required that two assays be performed. The fact that a single person
did not perform both assays does not negate the results obtained.
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In contrast, the majority seemed to confuse data that asserts a
fact with "empty data" that is put forward without any interpreta-
tion. This sort of empty data would not put forth any evidence."
Although this empty data classification may apply to the transfec-
tion results Schendel produced if he did not adequately explain the
graphs, this was only a small portion of Schendel's evidence and
should not result in summary judgment. Other data provided by
Schendel was adequately explained, and thus the majority was
wrong when it stated that "the nub of this case" is that there were
no analytical data. 7
When the majority concluded that anything less than the amino
acid sequence, the DNA sequence of the coding regions and the
molecular weight was "no data," the majority was in essence saying
that it would give almost total deference to the Board and that it
wanted an easy test to determine reduction to practice. Although
reduction to practice is a fact intensive decision for which the Board
deserves deference, such deference was misplaced on this occasion.
The Board's motives should have been questioned when it was
unduly critical of Schendel during the interference proceeding as it
erroneously reprimanded Schendel for masking dates and noted
that he was not part of an organized research endeavor." Addi-
tionally, the court's decision was less fact intensive than it realized.
The court could have easily determined that Schendel provided
evidence of reduction to practice "at first sight" without advanced
scientific knowledge. Deference as to the legal issue of prima facie
proof should not be accorded the Board, especially when it contra-
dicts precedent and a common meaning interpretation of relevant
statutes.
B. THE SEQUENCING TEST OF THE MAJORITY IS TOO STRINGENT A
REQUIREMENT FOR REDUCTION TO PRACTICE OF FUSION PROTEINS
Instead of following the guidelines of statutes and prior cases, the
majority declined to discuss the prima facie standard simply
See Hahn, 892 F.2d at 1033-34 (stating that graphical data would not constitute prima
facie evidence without an interpretation of the data).5t Schendel, 83 F.3d at 1404.
Id. at 1405. The court noted here that the PTO's own guidelines allow masking dates
in such circumstances and that Schendel was part of a large group of professional
researchers at the Genetics Institute.
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because Schendel did not argue for such a standard. Accordingly,
the majority apparently believed that Schendel's evidence should
have shown reduction to practice in the same way his case in chief
would have. Yet upon formulating a rule concerning reduction to
practice of fusion proteins, the majority not only set forth unclear
conclusions, but it also failed to take into account the policy behind
reduction to practice, the nature of the patented product, and the
standard of the profession.
By setting a standard that is too stringent, the majority cut
against the underlying policy of fairness apparent in reduction to
practice related statutes and cases. Evidence of this policy of
fairness can be found in the statutory language regarding reduction
to practice. Section 102(g) of the patent statute declares that a
"person is entitled to the patent unless before invention, the
invention was made ... by another who had not abandoned,
suppressed, or concealed [the invention]." 9 The statute continues
by stating that "[i]n determining priority consider not only
reduction to practice but also the reasonable diligence of the one
who was first to conceive and last to reduce to practice."9° Thus,
as a matter of fairness, the first or true inventor may reap the
benefits of a twenty year monopoly as long as he has been diligent
in obtaining the patent and has not abandoned or concealed the
invention.
Since Schendel did not abandon or conceal his invention for an
unreasonable amount of time, the issue of the interference was
whether he reduced the invention to practice. Prior to the 1990s,
scientists could meet the requirements of the above statute by
providing evidence of conception of a biotechnological product.91
Conception did have to be corroborated by other scientists, but the
inventor did not have to know how the invention worked.92
In 1991, the Federal Circuit decided the case of Amgen, Inc. v.
Chugai Pharmaceutical Co. 93 and interpreted the statute to
35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1988).
90 Id.
"' Conception does still apply to certain biotechnological assays. Garth Butterfield et al.,
Biotechnology Protection and Licensing, 431 PLI/PAT 235, 241 (1996) (citing Hybritech v.
Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc. 802 F.2d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
9Chiron Corp. v. Abbott Laboratories, 902 F. Supp. 1103, 1118 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
93 927 F.2d 1200, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1016 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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require both conception and reduction to practice for priority of
invention in the biotechnological arena. 4  The court made the
often quoted statement that "[i]n some instances an inventor is
unable to establish a conception until he has reduced the invention
to practice through a successful experiment. This situation results
in simultaneous conception and reduction to practice."95 Subse-
quently, several other cases applied what has been coined the
hybrid conception standard, and it seems to be the emerging
rule." In establishing this new hybrid conception standard, the
court recognized that new technology created a situation in which
conception did not always lead to the desired end product. In other
words, there were "uncertainties of the method."97 In Amgen
specifically, the court held that the EPO gene could not be defined
by the protein it encoded but must be sequenced to prove posses-
sion and priority." The court reasoned that the available meth-
ods along with the redundancy of the genetic code did not ensure
finding the gene after the resultant protein was found. The opinion
in Fiers v. Revel summed up the reasoning best when it stated that
granting a patent should "promote disclosure of invention, not of
research plans."'
The change in the priority standard to accommodate the chang-
ing technology shows that the Federal Circuit simply wants to
ensure that fairness is displayed in giving priority to one party over
another. The junior party cannot claim to "have" the invention at
a specific time if he is physically unable to produce the product
later. If Schendel had only produced his research plans to obtain
the protein, then the circuit's history would have supported the
court's granting of summary judgment. But this is not the
situation in the case at hand. Schendel provided evidence such as
the linker region sequences, specific activity data and results of
'Id.
9id. at 1206.
"See Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1915 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Chiron Corp. v. Abbott Laboratories, 902 F. Supp. 1103 (N.D.
Cal. 1995); Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164,25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1601 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Colbert
v. Lofdahl, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1068 (C.C.PA 1991) (applying hybrid conception test to
biotechnological patents).
" Angen, 927 F.2d at 1207.
9 Id,984 F.2d 1164, 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
1997] 371
19
Elsevier: Schendel v. Curtis: DNA Standards Misapplied to Fusion Protein Pa
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 1997
J. INTELL. PROP. L.
functional assays that showed he had already produced the protein
at the time in question. As the dissent notes, "[t]his is not a matter
of retrospective reconstruction of ambiguous experiments or vague
theories."" °
This author concedes that in the biotechnology arena, the
standard of proof should not be set slightly above vague theories or
retrospective reconstructive experiments, but instead must be much
higher. Based upon the policy of fairness, Schendel must have
compelling proof that he possessed the IL-3/G-CSF fusion protein
before Curtis possessed the same. Yet the majority's requirement
that Schendel provide the entire amino acid sequence and/or the
DNA sequence of the coding region goes far beyond a fair demon-
stration of proof because it is unreasonably costly (if not cost
prohibitive), is based upon DNA patents instead of fusion protein
patents, and does not conform to the standard of the profession.
1. Amino Acid Sequencing Requirement Erroneously Borrowed
From DNA Cases. Although sequencing has been the primary
method used to show reduction to practice of DNA products, this
same sequencing requirement should not be shifted into the realm
of fusion protein interferences as it places an undue burden on the
scientist. Using current technology, the amino acid sequence of a
protein can be determined, but the process is costly. To sequence
an entire protein, chemical processes first digest the protein into
thousands of small pieces since only a few amino acids can be
sequenced at a time.101 These fragments must be separated,
purified and subjected to chemical processes to determine each
amino acid's identity. This entire process must be repeated until
all amino acids are elucidated. 102 There are automated machines
that can perform these tasks, but the cost of maintaining or even
using these machines is high, too high for most scientists to engage
in sequencing unless there is an absolute need to know the exact
amino acid sequence. To make matters worse, some scientists may
never be able to meet the demands of the majority's test since not
all proteins are amenable to complete sequencing due to amino
terminal blockage.'0 3
1"0 Schendel v. Curtis, 83 F.3d 1399, 1409 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
101 VOET & VOET, supra note 40, at 109-22.
l 0 2 1&
'
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In contrast, the cost-prohibitiveness and administrative problems
do not arise with a requirement for DNA sequencing, and therefore
the DNA sequencing prerequisite for reduction to practice of DNA
products or processes is not unreasonable. The majority did not
recognize these practical differences between protein sequencing
and DNA sequencing as it seemed to apply DNA standards to
fusion protein patents. In defense of the majority, the Patent
Board did not recognize these differences either. In arriving at its
conclusion, the majority was simply deferring to the Board on a
technical matter in which the Board most likely had more exper-
tise. The problem with the court's almost total deference on
technical matters is that it makes the Board's conclusions absolute.
There is no one to double check or correct technical errors made by
the Board. One easy solution to this problem would be for the
court to compare the Board's standards to those of the relevant
scientific community.
If the majority in Schendel had looked to the standard of the
scientific community it would not have required protein sequencing.
Unlike the majority, the scientific community has recognized the
differences between DNA and proteins and does not require amino
acid sequencing for the publication of research papers on fusion
proteins, but does require DNA sequencing when DNA is the
subject of research papers.'" In fact, in publishing his own data
on the IL-3/G-CSF fusion protein, Curtis himself followed this
standard of the scientific community; his paper included neither the
amino acid sequence nor the DNA sequence of the coding re-
gions.'0 5
Courts may safely rely on the practices of the scientific communi-
ty since patenting and publishing are very similar. Both have
similar goals of requiring proof of actual inventions for the sake of
104 See, YASUSHI TAMADA ET AL., Preparation and Characterization of a Bifunctional
Fusion Enzyme Composed of UDP-galactose 4-Epimerase and Galactose-l-P-Uridylyltransfer-
ase 5 BIOCONJUGATE CHEMISTRY 660-65 (1994); OLE SIBBESEN ET AL., Putidaredoxin
Reductase-Putidaredoxin-Cytochrom P450cam Triple Fusion Protein 271 J. BIOL CHEM.
22462-69 (1996); WILLIAM S. MALLIARD ET AL., Calcium-dependent Binding of SZOOC to the
N-Terminal Domain ofAnnexin 1271 J. BIOL. CHEM. 719-25 (1996) (failing to require protein
sequencing when a fusion protein is critically important to the research paper).
10 CURTIS ET AL, Enhanced Hematopoietic Activity of a Human Granulocyte /Macrophage
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fairness and promoting the sharing of data between scientists.
Scientists want to be published because much like patents,
publication brings in revenue in the form of grants. In addition,
publishing is not easy as the paper is subject to peer review by
other scientists. In the author's opinion, this well organized system
provides a perfect resource to help the court determine what should
be required in proving possession of a biotechnological product.
Scientists are the most educated in this area and make these sorts
of decisions daily. Therefore, courts in general should look to the
standard of the profession for guidance, and, in particular, the
court in Schendel should have looked to this standard before it
required Schendel to sequence the protein.
Although it is true that amino acid sequencing would have
provided strong evidence that the fusion protein existed, and such
a rule would minimize the court's scientific interpretation, quick
and easy legal rules should not unduly burden the scientist. Amino
acid sequencing would unduly burden Schendel since it is cost
prohibitive, and a combination of other equally demonstrative tests
can be used.
Along with the impracticality of the protein sequencing require-
ment, prior cases and the statutory language do not require
Schendel to sequence the fusion protein as the majority believed
since these previous cases all involved the patenting of a DNA
process or DNA itself. Because the initial reasoning behind the
requirement for sequencing DNA products to prove reduction to
practice was based on the structure and function of the DNA in the
patented product or process, this same standard cannot be applied
to fusion proteins with different structures and functions.
Before most DNA cases arose, the courts composed the rule
concerning reduction to practice as follows: "[t]o establish reduction
to practice of a chemical composition, it is sufficient to prove 'that
the inventor actually prepared the composition and knew it would
work.' "'0' Subsequent cases applied this rule to product patents
or the product by process patents based on DNA and interpreted it
to require DNA sequencing.1 0 7 This interpretation arose as the
'06 Hahn, 892 F.2d at 1032 (quoting Mikus v. Wachtel, 542 F.2d 1157, 1159, 191 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 571, 573 (C.C.P.A. 1976)).
'07 See Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1200; Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc., 40
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courts determined that identifying the DNA by what protein it
encoded was not proof of reduction to practice. Specifically, the
court in Amgen held that an "alleged conception having no more
specificity than [the resulting protein] is simply a wish to know the
identity of any material with that biological property."
10 8
Part of the problem with defining the DNA by the protein it
encodes is due to the redundancy of the genetic code. Even if the
scientist knows the exact identity of the protein via its amino acid
sequence, he still does not know the exact sequence of the encoding
DNA. There could be thousands of possible combinations of triplets
that could encode for a single protein, and more importantly, there
is only one that actually does encode for the protein."° There-
fore, knowledge of the biological property, or protein, did not give
the researcher enough specific insight into the identity of the DNA.
Or in other words, it did not meet the actual possession require-
ment under the hybrid conception doctrine of reduction to practice.
Since most of the earlier cases were based on DNA product or
product-by-process patents, proof of possession always boiled down
to sequence of the DNA. The majority in Schendel seemed to adopt
the principle that something needed to be sequenced without
realizing that DNA patents and fusion protein patents are differ-
ent. Although the majority's strict sequencing test is logical for
reduction to practice of DNA products, it cannot be logically applied
to novel proteins.
Contrary to the problems encountered in determining the DNA
sequence by using the amino acid sequence, there is no problem in
determining the amino acid sequence using the DNA sequence.
Since there is only one possible amino acid sequence that can be
encoded for by a DNA triplet (no redundancy), knowledge of the
DNA sequence does give the researcher enough specific insight into
the identity of the protein. Thus, Schendel did not need to
sequence the entire DNA coding region to determine the amino acid
sequence. Schendel would have already obtained a written
description of the coding region sequence. This information, along
with the sequence of the linker regions, did meet the actual
1
"Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1206.
'" There will be more than one due to allelic variation, but this fact is insignificant to the
reduction to practice analysis.
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possession requirement under the hybrid conception doctrine of
reduction to practice.
Upon comparing the nature or structure of DNA and proteins it
is evident that the reasons underlying a sequencing requirement
for DNA patents are not applicable to fusion protein patents. DNA,
is not something that the scientist makes; it is a product of nature.
Thus a gene is patented not because the gene is invented, but
instead because the scientist "finds" the gene so that others may
also make use of it.11 In finding the gene, the researcher must
determine the exact endpoints of the gene via whole gene sequenc-
ing since genes are organized in tandem along the strand of DNA.
Other methods of finding genes, such as restriction digest and
partial sequencing, may result in only parts of the gene and/or
include parts of other genes on the fragment identified."1 There-
fore sequencing the entire gene is the only method available to
show that the researcher has found and possesses the entire gene.
A fusion protein is different from DNA, and accordingly the rules
that have been generated concerning proof of DNA possession
should not apply to fusion proteins. The specific ends of the protein
do not have to be determined by sequencing because there is no
problem with "picking up" unwanted portions of other proteins.
Unlike DNA, proteins are not generated in tandem, and the protein
of interest can be easily separated from other proteins.
Another distinction between DNA and proteins is that there are
many different tests that help the scientist determine if he
possesses a protein: analysis of molecular weight via SDS-
PAGE,1 2 antibody reactivity, specific activity, sequencing the
11 This enablement is essential to the patenting process as 35 U.S.C. § 112 requires the
inventor to set forth a written description of the invention, enable one of ordinary skill in the
art to make and use the invention, and set forth a best mode for carrying out the invention.
. The court in Chiron denied Abbott's claim of reduction to practice based on a
restriction map it had generated of the env protein. The court noted that subsequent
experiments showed that three restriction fragments consisted of no env, almost no env, and
only part of the env gene, respectively. Chiron Corp. v. Abbott Laboratories, 902 F. Supp.
at 1128.
11 SDS-PAGE stands for sodium dodecyl sulfate - polyacrylamide gel electrophoresis. It
is a means by which a mixture of proteins can be separated according to their size; the
proteins move through the gel after an electric current is applied and the larger proteins run
more slowly through the gel than the smaller proteins. The size of the protein of interest
is determined by comparing it with a standard mixture of proteins with known molecular
weights. VOET & VOET, supra note 40, at 98-99.
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amino terminal end of the protein, describing the vector used to
make the protein plus a myriad of functional tests. Unlike DNA
sequencing, no one practical test can unequivocally tell the
researcher he has a particular fusion protein in his hands. Instead,
several of the test results must be combined. For example,
molecular weight analysis is only helpful if the scientist knows the
protein is derived from a specific vector, or the molecular weight,
analysis is combined with the test for antibody reactivity (Western
blot analysis).
Also note that functional assays of proteins are possibly the best
suited tests for identifying proteins. Historically, proteins have
been identified based upon the functions they perform. Yet DNA
cannot be identified on a functional basis because its only function
is to provide a template for a protein; it is only the intermediary
and cannot be characterized by the function of its end product.
Therefore, based on the difference between DNA and proteins, the
cost prohibitiveness of protein sequencing and the lack of necessity
to sequence a fusion protein, one cannot simply borrow the DNA
sequencing rule and apply it so that protein sequencing is required.
2. The DNA Sequencing Requirement is Questionable. Because
the majority in Schendel implied that the DNA sequence of the
coding regions would be required but did not make clear if this was
an additional requirement or a replacement for amino acid
sequencing, the DNA sequencing requirement must also be
considered. Assuming that the amino acid sequence of the protein
is neither provided nor needed, the next question becomes whether
or not to require the DNA sequences of the IL-3 and G-CSF coding
regions.
Although the majority did not explain its reasoning for requiring
the DNA sequence, there are two possibilities. First, the court may
have required the DNA sequence simply because all previous
reduction to practice cases in the field of biotechnology involved
DNA and required the DNA sequence. If this was the reasoning,
the distinctions made earlier in this Recent Development between
DNA and proteins apply. In Schendel's case, he is not patenting
the DNA nor finding the DNA (as illustrated in Amgen). 113
Schendel's case is distinct from these other cases in that he is using
genes that have already been "found" and sequenced.
113 927 F.2d at 1200.
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This leads directly into the second possible reason for the
majority's DNA sequencing requirement: the DNA sequence was
required to prove the known reagent in the dissent's "known
methods/known reagents" argument. This argument contends that
Schendel placed genes with known sequences into a vector with a
known sequence using methods accepted and well known in the
scientific community, and, therefore, sequencing would only be
redundant.114 It is possible that the majority believed that the
reagents are not known until the genes are sequenced in Schendel's
hands, but the dissent claimed that this would be requiring
Schendel to "re-prove the basic structures.""'
The scientific community agrees with the dissent. Even when
the amino acid sequence is not provided, scientific journals have
not required the inventor to sequence the entire coding region of
the DNA." 6 Instead, journals have required sequencing of the
linker regions to ensure the gene is inserted in the correct orienta-
tion. This is a logical requirement because almost all scientists do
not "find" the genes they use; they obtain them from the person
who did "find" and sequence the gene. Therefore the inventor
obtains the printed sequence when he obtains the genes them-
selves. Re-sequencing the genes would only be a waste of time and
money.
VII. CONCLUSION
Biotechnological patents serve an important purpose in that they
provide scientists with an impetus to perform tedious and time
consuming work in an area that will only serve to benefit the
health of the masses. Therefore, both the Patent Board and the
courts must generate fair decisions and policies that encourage
scientists to patent their inventions and in the process share this
information with other scientists. The majority in Schendel did not
provide the scientists with such an opinion since parties like
Schendel may be discouraged from using the process in the future.
The majority opinion was problematic for several reasons. First,
the majority failed to apply Federal Circuit precedent concerning
summary judgment standards. The Federal Circuit had previously
114 Schendel v. Curtis, 83 F.3d 1399, 1409 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
"5 Id. at 1407.
116 TAMADA ET AL., supra note 104, at 660.
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determined that the junior party's case should not be rebutted by
the senior party since the junior party only needed to prove a prima
facie case. The court instead accepted Curtis's criticisms and
required Schendel to disprove hypothetical problems. The majority
failed to realize that this standard requires more than prima facie
proof of possession and thus is also in direct contradiction to
similar cases dealing with hybrid conception.
This Recent Development does not suggest that Schendel should
not have to put forth some probative data; it simply disagrees with
the majority on what is probative data. The majority declared that
the only probative data would be the molecular weight along with
the sequence of the DNA and/or protein. Although this data would
suffice as proof of possession, the requirement placed too heavy of
a burden on the scientist and disregarded other equally probative
tests. Amino acid sequencing is in most cases cost prohibitive, and
DNA sequencing of the entire coding region is redundant when the
fusion protein is constructed using accepted recombinant DNA
techniques and known sequences. The scientific community
recognizes this burden and thus has not required amino acid
sequencing or DNA sequencing of the coding regions in research
papers on fusion proteins. The standard of the scientific communi-
ty should be an important guidepost for the court since it has a
similar goal of fairness and is promulgated by those people with the
best knowledge of scientific matters. Understandably, the court
wants a rule that is easily administered and does not require a
scientifically unsophisticated court to second guess the factual
findings of the more knowledgeable Patent Board. But administra-
bility needs to be balanced with the underlying purpose of patent
law: providing an incentive for scientists to produce inventions
that are beneficial to the public. Although prior cases and section
1.617 both achieve this balance, the majority in Schendel tipped the
scales too far by failing to apply a proper prima facie standard and
setting too stringent a standard for reduction to practice of fusion
proteins. Therefore, the opinion of the majority was erroneous and
the decision of the Board should have been overturned.
LISA C. ELSEVIER*
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